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LEGAL SERVICES-PAST AND PRESENT
It has been eight years since the federal government first
began providing legal services to the poor. The program has
resulted in an unparalleled availability of legal assistance to those
who previously had been unable to afford such services.' Yet the
program has also raised profound questions about the respon-
sibilities of attorneys to their clients, to their profession, and to the
society in which they live and work. As the 93d Congress moves
closer to a decision on the future shape and character of the
federal legal services program, it is appropriate to reflect upon the
history of federal efforts in the field.
I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM
1965-1971-ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONTROVERSIES
A. Legslative Overview
Before the mid-1960's the legal profession had traditionally
provided legal services to the poor on a limited scale.3 In 1965,
however, as part of the War on Poverty, the federal government
assumed this responsibility. 4 The Legal Services Program (LSP) was
In 1965, there were 247 legal aid offices, of which 157 had a paid staff. By 1971, there
were 735 legal aid offices, of which 684 had a paid staff. In 1965, 414,000 cases were
handled; by 1971, this figure had grown to 1,237,275. In 1966, $4.3 million was the gross
cost of the programs; by 1971, this figure had risen to $77.2 million. See generally NATIONAL
LEGAL AID & DEFENDER AsS'N, STATISTICS OF LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER WORK IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1965); NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER AsS'N, 1971
STATISTICS OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE WORK IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1972).
The LSP has also devoted a good deal of attention to the educational function. See
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 2 (1966). But
see Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW.
927 (1966) (suggesting that LSP has not been adequately fulfilling its obligations in area of
education).
" See notes 115-59 and accompanying text infra.
" See E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES (1951). Prior to 1965, private
organizations engaged in well-meaning but inadequate efforts to provide legal representa-
tion to the poor. See generally Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 381 (1965); Marden, Equal Access to Justice: The Challenge and The Opportunity,
19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 153 (1962); Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty Program,
31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 211 (1966).
The very limited supply of legal services being offered by private legal aid societies is
described in one article which points out that in 1963 less than 0.2% of all funds spent on
legal services were spent on legal aid (civil cases only).
4 See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2994 (1970). The legal
services program was not among the programs specifically authorized by the Economic
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originally established within the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO) as a subsidiary of the Community Action Program (CAP).5
As initially organized, the LSP was not entitled to direct appropria-
tions from Congress, but received only the monies donated to it by
the CAP.6
The first priority of the new LSP was to use the funds it did
have to organize and begin to administer local legal services offices
throughout the country.7 These local legal services units were not
agencies of the government, but rather were private, nonprofit
enterprises, which were designed to respond directly to the legal
needs of the local community." As a result, legal services offices
took many different forms, ranging from the traditional legal
aid offices 9 to group legal services,' 0 experimental judicare
Opportunity Act of 1964. However, Congress, in the 1965 amendment to the Act, stated that
financial assistance to Community Action Programs (CAP) was not limited to named
programs. Act of Oct. 9, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-253, § 12, 79 Stat. 973-74. The effect of the
amendment was to allow OEO to provide additional and experimental services such as the
LSP, Project Headstart, and Upward Bound.
5 The statute provides that antipoverty assistance from federal, state, and local sources
be used to respond to local needs and conditions and envisions the creation of new types of
services to attack the causes of poverty. 42 U.S.C. § 2781(a)(1), (3) (1970).
The Community Action Agency (CAA) was established under tide II of the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964, id. §§ 2781-2837. An important goal of the Act is to encourage
'the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups
served" in CAA sponsored programs. Id. § 2781(4)(a). To ensure that this goal is met, the
CAA's are to be governed by boards consisting of 51 persons-one-third public officials,
one-third representatives of the poor of the area, and one-third local community leaders. Id.
§ 2791(b). For an excellent summary of the operating rules of the CAP, see J. KERSHAW,
GOVERNMENT AGAINs-r POVERTY 44-56 (1970).
6 There was no mention of the LSP in the Economic Opportunity Act in 1965.
Funding was made possible by the 1965 amendments to the Act which extended the
permissible programs beyond those specified in the language of the statute. See Act of Oct. 9,
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-253, § 12, 79 Stat. 974. (1970).
7 See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, How TO APPLY FOR A LEGAL SERVICES
PROGRAM (1966). In many instances, the CAA itself proposed to establish and administer an
LSP. In other cases, another community organization, such as an existing legal aid society, a
bar association, or a law school, chose to establish a program. In the latter situation this
organization was considered a delegate agency of the CAA and operated under contract with
it. Rarely did an LSP have no affiliation with the local CAA. Prior to submission of a
proposed program to the OEO for funding, the approval of the local CAA was necessary. Id.
at 43-44, 67.
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 2781 (1970); OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, Supra note 1, at 22-28
(directing that offices be established in poor neighborhoods; that education be given to poor
people, both in availability of legal services when needed, and in avoidance of legal
problems; and that research and law reform be undertaken).
9 In the traditional legal aid office, the only concern of the attorneys was to handle a
large volume of cases brought by poor persons. No effort was made to develop test-case
litigation, to create education programs for the community, or to serve in the role of lobbyist
for the poor.
10 See generally Bartosic & Bernstein, Group Legal Services As a Fringe Benefit: Laryers for
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programs," neighborhood practice organizations, 2 and law re-
form and research back-up centers. 3 No uniform standards were
applied to the operation of these centers. Eligibility requirements, 4
case load,' 5 and the extent of community participation 6 had to be
adapted by individual offices to suit local needs.
Forgotten Clients Through Collective Bargaining, 59 VA. L. REv. 410 (1973); Kriger, Pragmatic
Approach to Problems of Group Law Practice, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 1 (1969); Steiner,
Bargained-for Group Legal Services: Aid for the Average Wage Earner?, 11 ARiz. L. REv. 617
(1969). For a close analysis of certain group legal services projects, see Ashe, Group Legal
Services-Equal Justice in Fact: A Prognosis for the Seventies, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1167 (1972).
11 Four experimental judicare programs were funded by the OEO from the LSP budget
in 1966. Under ajudicare system, after a potential client is certified to be eligible by the local
Community Action Agency, he can then see a private attorney of his choice in his
community. The program will pay the attorney's fees at a rate of 80% of the minimum fee
schedule up to a maximum of $300 per case without approval of the localjudicare office. See
Preloznik, Wisconsin Judicare, 25 NLADA BRIEFCASE 91, 93 (1967).
The OEO has financed judicare experiments in rural Wisconsin, rural Montana,
Alameda County, California, and New Haven, Connecticut. The judicare system of supply-
ing legal services uses local practitioners instead of a special legal services staff. The
comparative effectiveness of the two methods has been the subject of considerable debate.
The majority of commentators prefer the staffed office approach. See Robb, Alternate Legal
Assistance Plans, 14 CATH. LAW. 127 (1968); Schlossberg & Weinberg, The Role of Judicare in
the American Legal System, 54 A.B.A.J. 1000 (1968). The main reasons expressed for prefer-
ring the staffed offices are: (1) legal services attorneys have become specialists in areag of
poverty law; (2) because of this expertise, staff attorneys are more efficient and consequently
less expensive than private attorneys; (3) the poor have more confidence in staff attorneys;
(4) judicare encourages more federal control and interference; (5) judicare is less visible to
the poor. See Robb, supra at 132-36.
The pending Legal Services Corporation bill provides for the "study ... of alternative
and supplemental methods of delivery of legal services to eligible clients including judicare,
vouchers, prepaid legal insurance, and contracts with law firms." See H.R. 7824, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. § 1007(g) (1974).
12 See Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services For the Poor, 80
HARV. L. REV. 805 (1967). See also Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049
(1970). For the view that the neighborhood offices have not been particularly successful, see
Cahn & Cahn, supra note 1, at 928-29.
'" See Note, Beyond the Neighborhood Office-OEO's Special Grants in Legal Services, 56 GEO.
L.J. 742 (1968). See also Sullivan, Law Reform and the Legal Services Crisis, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 1,
8 (1971).
"4 See Silverstein, Eligibility for Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 J. URBAN L. 549
(1967). Some commentators argue that the overly strict eligibility standards of legal aid
programs excluded many persons who should have received legal services. Carlin &
Howard, supra note 3, at 399. At present, eligibility standards vary widely from program to
program, but the general principle is that
[t]he standard should not be so high that it includes clients who can pay the fee of
an attorney without jeopardizing their ability to have decent food, clothing and
shelter. This is a program of legal assistance for the poverty-stricken.
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, supra note 1, at 19. For the proposed eligibility standard
embodied in the Legal Service Corporation bills, see note 149 infra.
Is See Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to Limit
Caseload, 46J. URBAN L. 217 (1969). See also Samore, Legal Services for the Poor, 32 ALBANY L.
REV. 509 (1968). Burdensome case loads have been a problem for the LSP and will continue
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The original administrative framework immediately generated
difficulty. The relationship between the CAP and the LSP was
never clearly defined, and it was uncertain which agency controlled
what functions. 17 The CAP had the power to make decisions
regarding the funding and refunding of local LSP's and often used
this power to exercise control over the programs.1 8 The inter-
twined organizational structure of the CAP and the LSP also
resulted in a substantial time-drain on project directors and
attorneys. 19 Furthermore, CAP's were far more susceptible than
to plague the program until the demand for services and the supply of attorneys is balanced.
Sullivan, supra note 13, at 5.
"n See generally Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J.
1317 (1964); Wexler, supra note 12. One specific suggestion for using human resources in
the community is to expand the role of paraprofessionals. See Statsky, Paraprofessionals:
Expanding the Legal Service Delivery Team, 24 J. LEGAL ED. 397 (1972).
17 Mr. John D. Robb, a member of the National Advisory Council, provides a general
description of the allocation of duties between the LSP and the CAP. Essentially, the LSP was
to control the administration and set the professional policies of the program. The LSP also
was to have a say in funding, staffing, and paying salaries in national, regional, and local
offices. The CAP, however, had the power ultimately to decide on funding, modifying, or
refunding programs. The CAP also had power to control the selection, promotion, and
payment of regional legal services lawyers. Where the powers of the two programs overlap-
ped, there was considerable tension. See Robb, Poverty Lawyers' Independence-Battle Cry for
Justice, 1 N.M.L. REV. 215 (1971). See generally Cahn & Cahn, supra note 16 (suggesting that
legal services programs should not be subordinate to other interest groups, i.e., CAP, but
should function independently). See also Cahn & Cahn, supra note 1; Hannon, Legal Services
and the Community Action Program: Oil and Water in the War on Poverty, 28 NLADA
BRIEFCASE 5 (1969); Note, The Legal Services Corporation: Curtailing Political Interference, 81
YALE L.J. 231 (1971). One author presents the rarely heard CAP side of the dispute. He
argues that the growing number of specific programs to be run by the CAP, e.g., Project
Headstart, Upward Bound, Emergency Medical Services, to name a few, results in the
specific earmarking of allocations to the program, thereby stifling local initiatives in the CAP.
J. KERSHAW, supra note 5, at 56.
18 See note 21 infra.
One study closely examined the relationship between a local LSP and the Economic and
Youth Opportunities Agency (EYOA), a local CAP agency in Los Angeles, California. The
head of the LSP said of the EYOA:
[W]e have been seriously delayed in our mission by some of the worst administrative
foul-ups it has been my unfortunate duty to encounter. In some cases, we began to
wonder if it was not due to intentional mishandling of matters which kept us from
receiving any funds for operation from August 1, 1966, until December 1.
Hannon, supra note 17, at 8. One legal services program director reported 16 trips to EYOA
in four months to secure the program's monthly check. Id. at 9. All of the poverty lawyers
interviewed felt that better results could be achieved if the CAP were bypassed. Id. at 10.
'9 [M]uch of the productive time of the lawyers in the regional offices was occupied
in attempting to explain decisions on professional aspects of the Legal Services
Programs to the Community Action staff. Similar controversies required substantial
time on the part of neighborhood lawyers in local legal services programs, particu-
larly the chief attorney's time, which thereby was diverted from the primary
function of rendering services to clients.
116 CONG. REC. 36,822 (1970).
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LSP's to direct political pressure and thus were often at odds with
LSP's which actively sought to assist the poor in their disputes with
landlords, police, social service agencies, and state legislatures.20
Because of these difficulties, Congress amended the Economic
Opportunity Act in 1966 to permit congressional appropriations to
be made directly to the LSP, thus removing most CAP control over
LSP funding.21 This action was followed in 196922 by an order of
the Director of the OEO, raising the LSP to independent status
20 Because CAP's dealt directly with leaders of the community, partly to raise the
required 20% local share of the funding of the agency, leaders of the CAP were very anxious
not to antagonize those upon whom they were dependent for financial support. In 1970, the
Chicago Committee on Urban Opportunity, an OEO-funded CAP, threatened to cut off
funds to a local LSP if it persisted in suing municipal agencies. See Pearson, To Protect the
Rights of the Poor: The Legal Services Corporation Act of 1971, 19 U. KAN'. L. RE.v. 641, 646
(1971).
At the national level, the program was subject to political pressure from the President,
who in turn was presured by state and local politicians. Although the resulting interference
did not greatly weaken the day-to-day effectiveness of local programs, it did at times take the
form of proposed congressional action which threatened the existence of the entire pro-
gram. See notes 101-03 and accompanying text infra. The program felt it could fight its
battles best at the national level (i.e., with Congress and the President) and therefore strongly
opposed any attempts to regionalize the LSP. See notes 106-09 and accompanying text infra.
21 Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-794, § 211-1(b), 80 Stat. 1451, 1462 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2812(b) (1970)).
Until the time of this amendment, the Community Action Agency was given a sum of
money by the CAP to spend at its discretion. After the formal recognition of the LSP, funds
were specifically designated by Congress for the program. This designation of funds limited
the discretion of the CAP over the LSP. However, the CAP did retain some controls over the
funding of local offices.
The 1966 amendment also delineated the role of local bar associations in the program:
[Tihe Director shall carry out programs ... which provide legal advice and legal
representation to persons when they are unable to afford the services of a private
attorney, together with legal research and information as appropriate to mobilize
the assistance of lawyers or legal institutions, or combinations thereof, to further the
cause of justice among persons living in poverty: Provided, That the Director shall
establish procedures to assure that the principal local bar associations in the area to
be served by any proposed program of legal advice and representation are afforded
an adequate opportunity to review the proposed program and to submit comments
and recommendations thereon before such program is approved or funded.
Id. § 211-1 (b). Support by the bar is crucial to the LSP's success. See McCalpin, The Bar Faces
Forward, 51 A.B.A.J. 548 (1965). See also notes 55-68 and accompanying text infra.
22 In the interim, few substantive changes were made in the program. However,
Congress did amend the Economic Opportunity Act in 1967 in order to make several
refinements of the LSP. See 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3) (1970). Most significant was the
designation of legal services as one of the new "special emphasis" programs. Id. "Special
emphasis" is defined in the statute as follows:
In order to stimulate actions to meet or deal with particularly critical needs or
problems of the poor which are common to a number of communities, the Director
may develop and carry on special programs under this section.
Id. § 289(a) (1970). At the same time three other "special emphasis" programs were also
begun-Project Headstart, Follow Through, and Comprehensive Health Services. Id. §§
2809(a)(1), (2), (4).
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within the OEO and relieving the CAP of administrative supervi-
sion over the LSP.2 3 Unfortunately, these two changes did not
guarantee that the LSP would remain totally free from outside
interference.2 4 As the work of LSP attorneys in the field began to
gain momentum, the agency inevitably found itself at odds with
private interests, including landlords, local businessmen, and gov-
ernment officials on the state and local level who were potentially
subject to embarrassment and exposure by legal services attorneys
and who therefore felt threatened by LSP activities. 25 Factions so
affected were likely to attempt to challenge, or at least contain, the
legal services program either directly or through friendly legis-
lators on the state and national levels.26
President Johnson, in a special message to Congress on March
14, 1967, had been one of the first to pinpoint the problem of
political interference and to warn of its danger:
Community action agencies should devote their energies to
self-help measures and new initiatives .... To be effective, it is
essential that they be non-partisan and totally disengaged from
any partisan political activity. This Administration . . . will be
constantly alert to the danger of partisan political activity and will
take the necessary steps to see that it does not occur.27
By 1971, however, the problem had grown to such dimensions
that both the Nixon Administration and the organized bar felt that
drastic changes were warranted, including the creation of an inde-
pendent Legal Services Corporation.28
There were several other important features of the 1967 amendment. The legislation
provided an expanded list of the kinds of legal services the program would make available
(see id. § 2809(a)(3)), declared the need to maintain a proper attorney-client relationship
(H.R. REP. No. 866, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1967)), and once again emphasized the role of
the state and local bar associations in the program. 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3) (1970). Finally, the
amendment expressly prohibited the use of LSP funds or personnel to aid a person indicted
for a crime. Id.
But see 2 LAw IN ACTION 6 (Feb. 1968) (specifying exceptions to ban on criminal
representation).
2'3 See 5 WEEKLY CONIP. PIREs. Docs. 1135 (1969).
24 Even after the LSP was separated from the CAP at the national level, there was still a
great deal of interaction at the local level between the local LSP's and CA's. Since all
communities have a privately organized community action agency or have established the
state or county as a community action agency pursuant to the statute (42 U.S.C. § 2790
(1970)), it is likely that at the local level and under the current political structure the two
must maintain extensive ties.
25 See Robb, Controversial Cases and the Legal Services Program, 56 A.B.A.J. 329, 331
(1970).
2' See notes 100-04 and accompanying text infra.
27 3 WEEKLY COMP. PIREs. Docs. 459 (1967).
28 On May 5, 1971, President Nixon sent a message to Congress proposing the
1974]
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While proposals for the establishment of a Legal Services
Corporation were being debated, the program continued to func-
tion as a part of the OEO.2 9 Because major structural changes
seemed to be in the offing, no effort was made during this period
to increase the size or scope of the LSP.30 Then in January 1973,
President Nixon announced his decision to dismember the OEO.3'
He appointed a new Acting Director of the OEO, Mr. Howard
Phillips, to carry out his mandate.3 2 Mr. Phillips immediately dis-
charged the Acting Director of the LSP,33 set a temporary
agency-wide thirty-day limitation on the refunding of programs,34
repealed all effoi-ts at law reform,35 and set severe restrictions on
hiring, promotions, travel, and annual leaves.36
In June of 1973, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia enjoined Mr. Phillips from any further action
to disband the OEO prior to its legal date of expiration.3 7 In a
establishment of a national Legal Services Corporation. 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 726
(1971). The organized bar strongly desired an independent LSP. See Arnold, Whither Legal
Services, I JURIs DOCTOR, Feb. 1971, at 3; Karabian, Legal Services for the Poor: Some Political
Observations, 6 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 253 (1972); Lenzner, Legal Services Fights for the
Poor, But Who Fights for Legal Services?, I JURIS DOCTOR, Feb. 1971, at 9; Robb, supra note 25.
See also notes 131-59 and accompanying text infra.
29 After attaining independent status within the OEO, the Director of the LSP was
made an Associate Director of the OEO with direct access to the OEO Director. Greater
independence led to more freedom and thereby to activities which aroused the hostility of
the program's opponents. More than ever, the President was anxious to move the program
out of the executive branch so that this hostility would be focused only on the Corporation.
See Arnold, The Knockdown, Drag-out Battle over Legal Services, 3 JURIS DOCTOR, April 1973, at
4.
30 See note 40 infra.
31 See 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 86-98 (1973). The President's budget for 1974
made no request for funding the OEO. This was in effect an order to disband the OEO and
to transfer the programs to other departments.
32 Id. at 122; see note 38 infra.
33 Arnold, supra note 29, at 4.
31 See CCH Pov. L. REP. 8719, at 9781 (1973).
35 Initially, law reform was not an enunciated goal of the LSP. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY, supra note 1. In 1967, a new set of goals for the program was promulgated in
a Manual. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, EVALUATION MANUAL: LSP (1967). Of the
five new goals set forth, law reform was given priority. None of these goals was ever made
official by publication in the Federal Register. In reaction to this policy, Acting Director
Phillips declared that:
(a) The Legal Services program has only one major goal . .. : To provide
quality legal services in noncriminal matters to individuals who meet the eligibility
criteria . . . and who are otherwise unable to afford counsel.
(b) Law reform will no longer be a primary or separate goal of the pro-
gram ....
45 C.F.R. § 1061.5-6 (1973). But see note 38 infra.
36 Arnold, supra note 29, at 5.
37 Local 2677, Am. Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973).
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separate action even Mr. Phillips's appointment as Acting Director
of OEO was held to be illegal because his name had never been
submitted to the Senate for confirmation. 38 The LSP continues to
operate with funds authorized by Congress in 1972; 39 however,
both these funds and the statutory life of the program itself will
end in June 1974, unless Congress enacts legislation establishing a
Legal Services Corporation or takes other emergency action.
B. Achievements
1. Funding
The amount of money spent for the OEO-LSP is one measure
of the program's growth during its first six years. 40 In general, the
After this ruling, Phillips issued an order rescinding many of his previous directives which
he felt were invalid in light of the decision. See 38 Fed. Reg. 14,260 (1973).
38 Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C.), motion for stay denied, 482 F.2d 669
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
"I See note 130 infra.
40 The relevant available statistics are provided here in chart form.
Funds Funds
Appropriated Spent
LSP's Offices Attorneys Clients (millions) (millions)
1966 160 500a  $27 a
1967 200b 6 0 0 b 1200 b  3 5 0 ,0 0 0 b $22- $28P
1968 2 6 0 d 8 5 0 d 1800d 4 7 5 , 0 0 0 d $32C $38c
1969 $46-
1970 265' 800' 1850f 900,000 $54g
1971 1,200,000' $61'
a See 1 LAW IN ACTION 4 (Aug. 1966). The OEO allocated an initial expenditure of $20
million to the LSP in fiscal year 1966. See note 15 and accompanying text supra. Forty-three
states and 37 of the 50 largest cities established programs in 1966. See I LAW IN ACTION 5
(Aug. 1966). In 1965, the year immediately preceding the inception of the program, the
federal government spent only $603,000 on legal services. See Greenawalt, OEO Legal Services
for the Poor: An Anniversary Appraisal, 12 N.Y.L.F. 62 (1966).
b LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, THE POOR SEEK
JUSTICE 3 (1967).
c Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-794, § 2(b)(2), 80 Stat. 1451. Of the $28 million
spent by the LSP in 1967, $22 million were appropriated by Congress and $6 million were
added by OEO Director Shriver.- Of the $38 million spent in 1968, $33 million were
appropriated by Congress, and $5 million were from the Director of the OEO. See Pious,
Congress, the Organized Bar, and the Legal Services Program, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 418, 436.
d Hearings on Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity Before the
Subcomm. on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 104-05 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
e Hearings on the Legal Services'Progrdra of the Office of Economic Opportunity Before the
Subcomm. on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 337 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
'See SUBCOMM. ON EMPLOYMENT, MANPOWER, AND POVERTY, OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM UNDER THE
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funding of the LSP has fallen short of its proponents' expectations.
In 1966, OEO asked each of its departments to submit a five-year
projection of its anticipated costs. These "five-year plans" were
then to be used by OEO to formulate its own budget requests. The
LSP projection was from $88 million in 1967 to $175 million in
1971. The CAP staff adjusted these figures with the result that
OEO Director Shriver ultimately requested a congressional ap-
propriation of $25 million in 1967 and $123 million by 1971. 41
Congress appropriated only $22 million in 1967, however, and
$61 million in 1971.42 Thus, the program received only one-third
of the funds it originally requested and only one-half of the
financial support that the OEO Director felt was adequate. 43 In
1970, the Office of Legal Services' Office of Information estimated
that the program was reaching only twenty-one percent of those
who needed legal services. 4 This left at least three million poor
persons, known to have legal problems, without legal assistance.
2. Staff Achievements
The national office of the LSP has made significant contribu-
tions to the success of the program. The professional staff in
Washington together with the National Advisory Committee has
established what is essentially a legal intelligence network. The
creation of a background literature in areas important to the
practice of the LSP's had an immense impact on the developing
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY: SELECTED REPLIES TO SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONNAIRE 8
(Comm. Print 1970). But see Karabian, supra note 28, at 255.
A measure of the increased organization and efficiency of the LSP is shown by the
decline of the net cost per case from $97 in 1967 to $53 in 1970. See Interview with Francis J.
Duggan, Director of Program Operations, Office of Legal Services, Office of Economic
Opportunity, in Washington, D.C., April 21, 1971, quoted in Pearson, supra note 20, at 642.
g 1970 Hearings 342.
41 Pious, supra note 40, at 433. Professor Pious argues that the low funding of the
program was due both to attempts by Congress to hold down spending in general and to
tight control of policy by the national bar associations. If the local bar associations had had a
greater degree of control over the LSP, they could have lobbied effectively for higher
budgets. Id. at 438.
42 See note 40 supra.
43 The inability of the program to maintain adequate funding levels was partly due to
the subordinate position of the LSP within the OEO. OEO Directors who succeeded Sargent
Shriver were relatively unenthusiastic in their support for the LSP and did not see any need
for large appropriations. The Bureau of the Budget was anxious to hold down federal
spending in the face of inflation spawned by the Vietnam War and therefore was not
receptive to pressure by lobbyists for the program. Presidents Johnson and Nixon often
spoke out in favor of the program, but rarely lent more than moral support to the LSP. See
Pious, supra note 40, at 436-37.
" 1970 Hearings 342.
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legal doctrines in such fields as tenants' rights and welfare law.
Another contribution at the national level was the establishment of
the large back-up centers which provided a network of researchers
to guide local practitioners in developing legislative reform and
appellate arguments. 45 Finally, the national office was influential in
the establishment of the Clearinghouse Review for Legal Services and
the CCH Poverty Law Reporter.46
During the LSP's first six years, the local LSP lawyers per-
formed well. Not only was the bulk of the case load handled
successfully, 47 but a number of decisions won by LSP attorneys had
considerable impact on the lives of the poverty-stricken. Two
landmark LSP cases, Brown v. Southall Realty Co.,48 and Edwards v.
Habib,49 made important contributions to housing law. The first
LSP case to reach the Supreme Court, Shapiro v. Thompson,5 °
produced significant advances in welfare law. In Shapiro, the Court
abolished the residency requirement as a test for welfare recipient
45 See note 13 supra. The model for the first back-up center was the Center on Social
Welfare Policy and Law at Columbia University, which is currently funded by the OEO.
There are now at least 12 back-up centers including centers at Boston College to study
consumer law problems, at the University of California at Berkeley to study housing and
economic development, at UCLA to study health problems of the poor, and at Harvard
University, where the center for Law and Education has aroused great controversy.
In the recent debates on the proposal to establish a national Legal Services Corporation,
the continued existence of back-up centers has become a major issue. The House bill (H.R.
7824, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)) eliminates the back-up centers. See note 142 infra. The
Senate version (H.R. 7824 as amended January 31, 1974) continues to support the back-up
centers.
46 The Clearinghouse Review was established with OEO funding to provide current
information on the work of the LSP's to all who are engaged in legal services for the poor.
The CCH Poverty Law Reporter is not funded by the LSP, but is similarly engaged in reporting
the work of LSP's, thus increasing the publicity given to decisions affecting the poor. In
1973, the Clearinghouse Review had a budget of $276,600. See 120 CONG. REC. S 969 (daily ed.
Jan. 31, 1974).
41 See note 49 infra.
48 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968). In Brown, the defense of illegal contract was held
to be available to a tenant upon his landlord's suit for possession for nonpayment of rent
when serious building code violations existed at the time of letting. At the time, at least
100,000 units in the District of Columbia were in violation of the housing code. The
landlords of these units were henceforth estopped from compelling the tenant to pay rent or
from evicting for nonpayment of rent. See 2 LAW IN ACTION 1 (Feb. 1968). But see
Comment, Lease Executed in Violation of Distriet of Columbia Housing Regulations Is an Illegal
Contract-Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 66 MICH. L. REv. 1753, 1761 (1968).
49 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1968) (retaliatory eviction upon
filing of housing code complaint held illegal).
Both Brown and Habib involved the Neighborhood Legal Services Project, Washington,
D.C. (NLSP). See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, 4TH ANNUAL REPORT: As THE SEED IS
SOWN (1969). See also P. WALD, LAW AND POVERTY: 1965 at 74-76; Pye, supra note 3, 231-43.
50 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
1974] 969
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
eligibility; 51 the monetary relief to the poor as a result of this
decision has exceeded the entire cost of the LSP. 52 Two other
important welfare cases brought by LSP attorneys were King v.
Smith53 and Goldberg v. Kelly. 54
3. Relationship with the Organized Bar
The LSP has always been dependent upon the active and
enthusiastic support of the nation's organized bar.55 The organized
bar is a highly influential lobby on the local, state, and national
levels, and its support is essential to counteract the opposition of
other groups whose interests may be endangered by LSP actions. 56
The bar has also been assigned a specific statutory role in the
51 At the time the Shapiro suit was instituted in 1967, 41 states had residency require-
ments. LSP lawyers had already won six federal court decisions on the issue of the
constitutionality of residency requirements and 14 other cases were pending in other
jurisdictions.
52 Striking down the residency requirements for welfare recipients was estimated to
have resulted in the payment of $140-200 million annually to 100,000 recipients. 3.LAw IN
ACTION 1 (Oct.-Nov. 1968).
53 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (state "substitute father" rules which deny benefits to eligible
children whose mother lives with employable man struck down). King was researched by an
OEO-funded welfare law research center at Columbia University Law School. HEW esti-
mated that as a result of the decision 400,000 children would receive $200 million per year
in benefits. Man-in-the-house laws had existed in 19 states and the District of Columbia. See
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, supra note 49, at 31.
54 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare recipients entitled to hearing before payments discon-
tinued). The LSP has obtained judgments beneficial to the poor in other areas as well. See,
e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (alternative penalties ofjail or fine unconstitutional as
applied to indigents); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce proceedings
brought in forma pauperis).
One of the most active and controversial LSP's is California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc.
(CRLA), founded in 1966. For an excellent and brief overview of CRLA, see Karabian, supra
note 28, at 257-61. It is useful, as an example of the battles being fought by LSP's, to look at
some of the impressive victories of this program. In one of the earliest and most highly
publicized of the CRLA cases, California was forced to restore $210 million in cut-backs that
had been made in medical aid funds. Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 433 P.2d 697, 63
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1967). The political and financial costs to Governor Reagan of CRLA's victory
in Williams were so great that he was determined to limit the program's effectiveness by
applying pressure on Congress and the President to curtail grants to CRLA.
Governor Reagan vetoed the $1.8 million grant to the CRLA for 1971. The Director of
the OEO then established a three-man commission to make an investigation of the situation.
This commission said that the CRLA was not guilty of misconduct, and the OEO refunded
the program. The attack on CRLA illustrated the great vulnerability of the programs to
political interference. See 3 LAW IN ACTION 2 (Dec. 1968).
'5 See Greenawalt, supra note 40; Hannon, Legal Services and the Local Bars: How Strong is
the Bond?, 6 CALIF. WESTERN L. REv. 46 (1969); McCalpin, supra note 21; Pye & Garraty, The
Involvement of the Bar in the War Against Poverty, 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 860 (1966); Stumpf,
Law and Poverty: A Political Perspective, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 694.
6 See notes 64-65, 103 & 106-09 and accompanying text infra.
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program by the 1966 and 1967 amendments to the Economic
Opportunity Act.57
Because no single bar association represents all practicing
lawyers and because there are great differences in the outlook and
interests of national, state, and local bar associations,58 it is difficult
to generalize accurately about the response of "the bar" to the
federally funded legal services programs. 59 It is fairly clear, how-
ever, that the national bar associations supported the fledgling
program,6 0 although the favorable response may well have been
prompted more by a sense of self-preservation than by a real desire
to aid those in need of legal assistance.6'
57 See notes 22 & 27 supra. In 1969, rules were published to implement the statutory
directive requiring that the OEO consult with state and local bar associations.
The State bar association and the principal local bar associations must be given
an opportunity to comment directly to OEO on proposed legal services prcjects
before they are funded. They must also be given the opportunity to comment
directly to OEO on the operations of ongoing programs. The same opportunities
shall be afforded local bar associations composed primarily of lawyers from minor-
ity groups. In addition to these requirements, each local project is expected to
maintain continuing cooperation with State and local bar associations, including
consultation during the preparation of the grant application.
45 C.F.R. § 1061.2-3 (1973).
58 For a discussion of the bar associations' varying views on legal services, see Pye &
Garraty, supra note 55, at 861-62.
59 For a discussion of the opposition by several bar associations, see J. HANDLER,
NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVICES-NEw DIMENSIONS IN THE LAW (L. Wells ed. 1966). The
reasons for opposition include: (1) fear of competition with private practitioners, (2)
competition with existing legal assistance programs, (3) fear that federal funding might
result in federal control and lead to unethical conflicts of interest, and (4) fear that affiliation
with the CAP would violate the Canons of Ethics. Id. at 12. One of the bar associations most
violently opposed to OEO-financed legal services was that of Tennessee. See Bethel &
Walker, Et Tu, Brute!, I TENN. B.J. 11 (Aug. 1965).
60 On February 8, 1965, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
adopted a resolution in support of legal services programs being developed by the OEO:
FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Association, through its officers and appropriate
Committees, shall co-operate with the Office of Economic Opportunity and other
appropriate groups in the development and implementation of programs for
expanding availability of legal services to indigents and persons of low income, such
programs to utilize to the maximum extent deemed feasible the experience and
facilities of the organized Bar such as legal aid, legal defender, and lawyer referral,
and such legal services to be performed by lawyers in accordance with ethical
standards of the legal profession . ...
McCalpin, supra note 21, at 551. Support was also given by the National Bar Association
(NBA), the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) and the American Trial
Lawyers Association (ATLA). The board of governors of the ATLA overrode its president
and vice-president in order to support the OEO program. See Greenawalt, supra note 40, at
62.
61 Mr. F. William McCalpin, Chairman of the Committee on Lawyer Referral Service of
the ABA expressed this feeling:
Adoption of the resolution represents but the first step in what must be a long,
historic and sometimes difficult push forward by the legal profession to meet the
needs of the public we are sworn to serve. The consolation is that by pushing
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Much of the impetus for the prompt support of the national
bar associations came from the OEO's promise that a National
Advisory Council (NAC) consisting of leaders of the American Bar
Association (ABA), National Bar Association (NBA), National
Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA), American Trial
Lawyers Association (ATLA), the General Counsel of OEO, the
Attorney General, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, would be established to serve as an official liaison between
OEO and the professional legal community.62 The role of the NAC
was to police the professionalism of the programs, n3 to provide a
needed conduit for effective communication between government
agencies and private attorneys, 64 and to lobby for or against ad-
ministrative and legislative proposals affecting the program.6 5
Since 1971, when the NAC prepared a report supporting the
establishment of a Legal Services Corporation, the OEO has by-
passed the NAC, 66 using the rather transparent argument that a
separation of the Office of Legal Services from OEO was immi-
nent. Thus, in the past two years the importance of the NAC has
decreased greatly.
A caveat needs to be added to the foregoing description of the
role of the organized bar in the development of legal services for
the poor. Although the cooperation of the bar is important to the
success of the program, 67 the interests of the organized bar and of
forward we can remain the masters in our own house. The risk is that if we falter
the job will be done for us, not by us.
McCalpin, supra note 21, at 551.
62 See generally Pious, supra note 40.
63 One of the most widely held fears of the bar associations is that the LSP would
encourage a decline in professional standards.
64 Real hostility or antagonism by local bar associations could ensure the failure of any
particular program. Thus, the role of-the NAC was to allay the fears of local groups of
attorneys, such as the legal aid societies.
65 Lobbying is the most important function the bar has performed. Each time the OEO
has proposed changes which the organized bar felt would interfere with the independence
of the attorney in his relations to his client, or which would impose the control of nonlawyers
over legal decisions, the bar has spearheaded the fight to prevent these destructive changes.
See notes 106-09 and accompanying text infra.
Moreover, when serious threats have been made in Congress, the defeat of those
proposals was directly attributable to the work of the NAC and of the organized bar. See
notes 101-03 and accompanying text infra.
66 For example, in 1972 Mr. Ted Tetzlaff was appointed Acting Director of the Office
of Legal Services without consultation with the NAG. See Haddad, The National Advisory
Committee to Legal Services, 30 NLADA BRIEFCASE 198, 202 (1972). The NAC was abolished by
Mr. Howard Phillips, Acting Director of the OEO. See Arnold, supra note 29, at 4.
67 See, e.g., Pye & Garraty, supra note 55; Stumpf, supra note 55; Note, Competition in
Legal Services Under the War on Poverty, 19 STAN. L. REV. 579 (1967).
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the LSP do not necessarily correspond: "Hostility is certain to result
in the future if the support of the bar is achieved under the guise
of giving a poor man a right to counsel when the real objective is
providing the legal leadership for institutional reform. '16  One of
the anomalies of the current program is that the LSP depends on
the support of the organized bar, yet simultaneously attempts to
maintain independence in determining its own priorities.
C. Controversies
1. Ethics
Because the OEO-LSP is attempting to provide a specialized
form of legal services to a new class of clients, some of the methods
employed by legal services attorneys create potential conflicts with
the traditional ethical standards of the legal profession. 69
One of the most important objectives which the LSP has
established for itself is the education of residents of the com-
munities which it serves about their legal problems and the sources
to which they may turn for assistance. Local offices have initiated
publicity campaigns70 to alert the poor to the illegal practices to
which they are often subjected. Such a program of "advertising"
and "stirring up litigation" poses significant ethival questions; how-
ever, upon closer examination it appears that neither the old ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics nor the newly adopted Code of Profes-
68 Pye, supra note 3, at 244-45.
69 The ABA published the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908. As early as 1924, the
report of the Committee on Professional Ethics suggested revisions of the Canons. This
suggestion was repeated in reports of 1933, 1935, and 1955, but no action was taken until
1965 when a Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards was created. The final
draft of the new Code of Professional Responsibility was reported in 1969, adopted by the ABA
in August of that year, and became effective in 1970. See generally Wright, The Code of
Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1970).
The new Code replaces the Canons and makes some significant changes. Certain rules
have been eliminated; others have been modified or clarified.
In the LSP's formative years, many writers expressed concern over the difficulties faced
by an LSP in adhering strictly to the profession's canons of ethics. See P. WALD, supra note
49, at 98-109; J. HANDLER, supra note 59, at 19-25; Special Supplement: Legal Services and Legal
Ethics, 2 LAW IN ACTION 3-10 (Sept. 1967). See also Greenawalt, supra note 40; Pye & Garraty,
supra note 55; Note, Ethical Problems Raised by the Neighborhood Law Office, 41 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 961 (1966).
70 A neighborhood lawyer may desire, as part of a community action education
program, to give lectures to indigenous groups on their legal rights and on the
availability of free legal services; to advise individuals in such meetings to engage in
litigation concerning welfare, landlord-tenant, and other problems affecting them.
• ..He may go further and invite them to use his service in such litigation.
P. WALD, supra note 49, at 100. This kind of activity by program lawyers is known to
encourage residents to seek legal advice. See Special Supplement, supra note 69, at 7.
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sional Responsibility automatically prohibits such activities on the part
of legal services attorneys. 71
In 1935, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grieva nces, in interpreting the Canons, carefully distinguished be-
tween advertising for personal gain and advertising oriented to-
wards helping those in need of legal assistance.7 2 The committee
condemned the former kind of advertising on the ground that it
might expose an uninformed public to abusive practices. 73 That
same danger would not be present in an advertising program
conducted by a government agency for the purpose of protecting
an unwary public.
In the new Code, exceptions to the prohibition of solicitation
and stirring up litigation are even clearer. Section DR 2-104(A)(2)
of the Code reads:
A lawyer may accept employment that results from his participa-
tion in activities designed to educate laymen to recognize legal
problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel, or to utilize
available legal services if such activities are conducted or spon-
sored by any of the offices or organizations enumerated in DR
2-103(D)(1) through (5) . . .74
Sections DR 2-103(D)(1)-(5) include legal aid organizations spon-
sored by the government, law schools, nonprofit community
organizations or bar associations, and four other categories of
organizations providing legal services.7 5
The problem of advertising is not the only ethical question
raised by the LSP. Canon 35 of the old standards stated that no lay
groups should intrude in the relations between a lawyer and his
client, although an exception was always made for charitable
organizations. 76 Canon 35 had a twofold effect on the LSP. First,
since the LSP was originally a subsidiary of the CAP, the individual
71 Canon 27 prohibited forms of advertising by attorneys, with the exception of calling
cards. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 27 [hereinafter cited as CANONS]. Canon
28 prohibited a lawyer from fomenting litigation. Id. No. 28. More recently, the Supreme
Court recognized the right of a lawyer to instigate litigation at the behest of an interested
third party. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
72 See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, OPINIONS No. 148 (1936).
73 Id. at 291.
74 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A)(2) [hereinafter cited as
CODE]; see Nahstoll, Limitations on Group Legal Services Arrangements Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, DR 2-103(D)(5): Stale Wine in New Bottles, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 334,350
(1970).
75 CODE DR 2-103(D)(1)-(5). But see ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAw SCHOOLS, THE
AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES-1972, at 26.
76 CANONS No. 35.
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attorney-client relationship was subject to potential influence by
CAP personnel. Second, the statute required that the programs
must involve the "maximum feasible participation of the poor. '7 8
In both of these situations, the potential control by nonlawyers of
legal decisionmaking raised the possibility of further conflict with
Canon 35.
The new Code does not forbid a lawyer to be employed by a lay
organization, but still warns the lawyer to insulate himself from
interference by nonlawyers.7 9 Moreover, in the section on discipli-
nary rules, the lawyer is specifically forbidden from allowing his
employer to regulate or control his professional judgment.80 The
drafters of the Code remain concerned about the independence of a
lawyer from those who would seek to control his decisions. 8 1 Canon
35 has been superseded by the Code with its liberalized stance on
lawyers' employment by lay organizations. Yet the dangers of
interference remain the same, and opinions and decisions relating
to Canon 35 are applicable to the limitations implied in the Code.
A third rule in the Canons created problems for legal services
lawyers. Canon 37 directed that a lawyer was never to disclose
information revealed to him by a client without the client's
permission.8 2 By strictly adhering to this rule, lawyers were unable
to cooperate with layworkers in the same poverty project. For
77 Ske notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra. In response to political pressure, or
different self-interests, a local CAP has occasionally attempted to force an LSP attorney to
drop a potentially embarrassing or troublesome suit. This is the kind of intrusion by a lay
group which is offensive to the ethical standards of the legal profession.
78 See note 5 and accompanying text supra. See also J. HANDLER, supra note 59, at 23.
79 CODE EC 5-23:
A person or organization that pays or furnishes lawyers to represent others
possesses a potential power to exert strong pressures against the independent
judgment of those lawyers .... Since a lawyer must always be free to exercise his
professional judgment without regard to the interests or motives of a third person,
the lawyer who is employed by one to represent another must constantly guard
against erosion of his professional freedom.
80 Id. DR 5-107(B).
s The kinds of interference which have been and will continue to be felt by legal
services attorneys are specifically mentioned in the Code:
Some employers may be interested in furthering their own economic, political, or
social goals.... Others may be far more concerned with establishment or extension
of legal principles than in the immediate protection of the rights of the lawyer's
individual client. On some occasions, decisions on priority of work may be made by
the employer rather than the lawyer with the result that prosecution of work
already undertaken for clients is postponed to their detriment.
Id. EC 5-23.
82 The duty to preserve his client's confidences . . . involves the disclosure or
use of these confidences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer... or to the
disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though
there are other available sources of such information.
CANONS No. 37.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
example, many different professionals will often work in the same
building to handle individual cases in a more efficient manner.
This enables social workers, welfare workers, counselors, and at-
torneys to share centralized information files and a cross-
professional referral system. Lawyers are often the weak link in this
chain because of the inhibiting effect of the confidentiality rule, as
well as Canon 47's proscription of the unauthorized practice of
law. 83 Consequently, lawyers have hesitated to share information
with nonlawyers.8 4 This inability to cooperate has its greatest effect
on the client himself who is consequently unable to receive ade-
quate or appropriate treatment of interrelated legal and nonlegal
problems. 85 The Code has not made substantial changes in Canon
37. Canon 4 imposes a general rule of strict confidentiality, requir-
ing the client's consent to a disclosure of confidential information. 86
A final problem is presented by the old Canon 15, which raised
the question of how zealously the lawyer should support his client's
position.8 7 Must a lawyer adhere strictly to his client's wishes? Is it
wrong for a lawyer to encourage a client not to make a settlement
because the lawyer feels that a judicial decision is vital? Is it wrong
for a lawyer to turn down routine cases in favor of test-case
litigation? The Code repeats the profession's traditional view in
answering these questions, 88 but guidelines promulgated by the
83 CANONS No. 47.
84 See J. HANDLER, supra note 59, at 20-22. Sometimes outsiders try to abuse the
confidentiality privilege between lawyer and client. When evaluating the programs, local
CAP officials occasionally used the opportunity to look through the files of a project attorney
to discover any potentially embarrassing appeals that were to be prosecuted.
Consent by a client to divulge confidential information raises difficult legal questions.
Consent must be given with full knowledge and understanding by the client, which often is
difficult to prove in the case of a poor, uneducated client. Poverty lawyers, rather than
risking possibly unethical behavior, often refused to share information.
" See generally J. HANDLER, SUpra note 59; Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF
AMERICANS: WHAT THEY ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE (N. Dorsen ed. 1970); Sparer, The
Role of the Welfare Client's Laryer, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 361 (1965); Wexler, supra note 12.
8 See CODE, Canon 4. In the ethical considerations and disciplinary rules following the
new Canon 4, there is no discussion of the problems of information gathering or central data
systems used by co-professionals. Since the problem had been identified well before the
drafting of the new Code, it is noteworthy that the difficulties arising out of the
confidentiality rule were simply avoided.
87 CANONS No. 15.
" See id. CODE, Canon 7.
In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to
point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as
legally permissible. . . . In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always
remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or
methods because of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself.
Id. EC 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
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LSP for the practicing poverty lawyer were often so broad and
vaguely worded as to be useless as a practical rulebook for attor-
neys:
Needless to say, attorneys directed or employed in a legal
services program must ensure that the conduct of the program
conforms to the Canons of Professional Ethics . . . [which] are
intended primarily to serve the best interests of the public.
Neither the letter nor the spirit of the Canons prohibits the
effective representation of the poor.89
2. Goals-Service, Law Reform, or Both?
As alluded to above, the issue causing the most controversy
about the LSP was whether project attorneys should engage in
judicial or legislative law reform activity.90 In 1972, for example,
former Vice President Agnew criticized the LSP for ignoring the
individual client in favor of the "test-case" client who serves as a
vehicle for the attorney's view of society. 91 Mr. Agnew's views were
89 OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, supra note 1, at 8-9.
A number of ethical problems have been raised in connection with alternative methods
of providing legal services. For a critical comment on the rules of the bar against solicitation
see Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 674
(1958). For two critiques of the minimum fee schedules approved by the bar, see Note, A
Critical Analysis of Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 HARV. L. REv. 971 (1972); Note,
The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-Commercial" Activities, 82
YALE L.J. 313 (1972).'For a look at the Code treatment of the specialization concept, see
Wallace, The Code of Professional Responsibility-Legislated Irrelevance?, 48 TEXAs L. REv. 311
(1970). And for a discussion of attitudes toward group legal services, see Nahstoll, supra note
74; Comment, Group Legal Services and the New Code of Professional Responsibility, 20 BUFFALO
L. REv. 507 (1970).
"0 Not all of those who have written on the role of legal services feel that law reform
activity is justified. See note 20 supra. Professor Hazard of the University of Chicago Law
School argues that the LSP has mistakenly favored litigation-oriented law reform over
legislative-oriented reform:
In the light of the limitations on what courts can do in law reform, the
legislative course would seem obviously preferable for achieving law reform on
behalf of the poor that is structural rather than symptomological, general in its
effect rather than "show case."
Hazard, Law Reforming in the Anti-Poverty Effort, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 242, 250 (1970).
Professor Hazard goes on to question whether it is proper for a government-funded agency
to act as lobbyist for a special interest group-the poor. His conclusion is that it is dangerous
and undemocratic for a government agency to formulate what is supposed to be the will of
the people. Id. at 254.
See generally Hannon, The Leadership Problem in the Legal Services Program, 4 LAw & Soc'Y
REV. 235, 242-43 (1969); Hannon, supra note 17, at 5; Shriver, Law Reform and the Poor, 17
Am. U.L. REv. 1 (1967); Note, supra note 12. These authorities argue that law reform should
be carried out as a primary goal of the LSP.
91 Agnew, What's Wrong With the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 930, 931 (1972):
What we may be on the way to creating is a federally funded system manned by
ideological vigilantes, who owe their allegiance not to a client, not to the citizens of a
1974]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:960
widely shared both inside and outside the legal community. 92
The leaders of the LSP have never taken a definite stand on
the role of law reform activity in the work of a particular
program. 93 At the outset, some LSP supporters argued that the
LSP ought not become a mere legal aid office on a national scale.
These people felt that continuing the traditional approach would
merely treat the symptoms and not the cause. 94 On the other side
of the debate were other LSP supporters who wanted the program
to maintain a strict service approach and avoid social engineering. 95
particular state or locality and not to the elected representatives of the people, but
only to a concept of social reform.
But see Klaus, Legal Services Program: Reply to Vice PresidentAgnew, 58 A.B.A.J. 1178 (1972). In
response to Mr. Agnew's criticisms, Mr. Klaus stated that only 17% of all legal aid matters
ever reached trial, indicating that 83% ended in settlement, and that 80% of all legal aid
cases were in the four classic nonpolitical poverty law areas of domestic relations, housing,
consumer, and welfare law.
92 See note 88 and accompanying text supra. See also note 98 and accompanying text
ifra.
93 The initial statement on policy of the OEO-LSP has always been the OEO Guidelines.
On page two, the overall objectives of the program are specified. There is no mention of law
reform activity. Yet later, almost as an afterthought, the law reform function is recognized:
Advocacy of appropriate reforms in statutes, regulations, and administrative
practices is a part of the traditional role of the lawyer and should be among the
services afforded by the program. This may include judicial challenge to particular
practices and regulations, research into conflicting or discriminating applications of
laws or administrative rules, and proposals for administrative and legislative
changes.
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, supra note 1, at 23.
9' See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
We cannot be content with the creation of systems of rendering free legal
assistance to all the people who need but cannot afford a lawyer's advice. This
program must contribute to the success of the War on Poverty .... Lawyers must
uncover the legal causes of poverty, remodel the systems which generate the cycle
of poverty and design new social, legal and political tools and vehicles to move poor
people from deprivation, depression, and despair to opportunity, hope, and ambi-
ton.
Address by E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., National Conference of Bar Presidents, Feb. 19,
1966, quoted in Stumpf & Janowitz,Judges and the Poor: Bench Responses to Federally Financed
Legal Services, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1058, 1059 (1969).
The ABA has given explicit support to lobbying and law reform objectives in the new
Code of Professional Responsibility. See CODE EC 8-2.
Others who generally took the more innovative position included academics and project
attorneys. The poor community itself was split. In part, its leaders were aware of the value of
law reform efforts, but at the same time, they knew that the people were in desperate need
of routine legal services.
95 At the beginning, the bar associations believed the new LSP was just a more efficient
way of providing more legal aid: "[I]f the program was properly implemented along
professional lines, it would merely involve financial assistance to local communities for more
and better legal aid-a movement which the organized bar had been actively promoting for
many years." Marden, Introduction, Symposium: Justice and the Poor, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 843,
845 (1966) (emphasis added). Others who supported the narrower approach included
business and professional community leaders, and some politicians. See notes 100-03 and
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As a result of this split among supporters of the program, the
leadership was forced to adopt an ambivalent attitude which left
programs and attorneys without guidance. 96
In spite of Washington's initial ambivalence, the program's
staff developed a penchant for law reform activity. 97 Since this
development occurred while many service programs were already
functioning, there was fear that the new direction might cause a
decline in the quality of services. This fear proved groundless. 98
However, the movement toward law reform did increase the politi-
cal opposition of many established interests which suddenly felt
vulnerable to an attack from reform-oriented legal services
attorneys .99
Many of the attempts to shift the LSP's direction attracted
considerable national attention. For example, Senator Murphy of
California twice tried to curtail the power, of the LSP and thereby
of the California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc.' In 1967, he of-
fered an amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act which
would have forbidden one government-funded program from
suing another,' 10 and in 1969, he proposed that the governor of
accompanying text infra (discussing amendments proposed by Senator Murphy of Califor-
nia).
96 Because the leadership was unable to choose between the service approach and the
law reform route, it called for simultaneous work on both fronts. According to one
commentator, this policy led to an emphasis on "service to individuals at the expense of
other goals." Hannon, The Leadership Problem in the Legal Services Program, supra note 90, at
246.
97 See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, EVALUATION MANUAL: LSP (1967); note 35
supra. The goals enunciated in the Evaluation Manual, in contrast to the earlier OEO
Guidelines, showed a growing concern with law reform. See Hannon, The Leadership Problem in
the Legal Services Program, supra note 90, at 244.
98 Law reform has at least three elements-research and drafting, litigation, and
legislative lobbying. An attorney handling 1,000 cases a year cannot do the kind of legal
research necessary to provide the basis for reforming the legal system. Back-up centers,
academics, and law students have functioned as the research division of the LSP. See note 12
supra.
The most widespread fear regarding law reform activities was that local service to the
individual client would be curtailed in favor of test-case litigation; the tenor of the Evaluation
Manual only reinforced this belief. See notes 35 & 97 supra.
The goals of a law reform policy appear to be consistent with the initial idea that the
war on poverty should attack the root causes of poverty, but the enforcement of this
policy by federal fiat is inconsistent with the promise of local control.
Hannon, The Leadership Problem in the Legal Services Program, supra note 90, at 251.
99 See note 25 and accompanying text supra. Others believed that only a militant LSP
would be capable of solving problems while working within the law. See U.S. NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 152 (1968).
100 See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
101 "Provided, no project under such program may grant assistance to bring any action
against any public agency of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision
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each state should have the absolute power to veto any programs, or
parts of programs, in his state.' 0 2 Both of the proposals were
eventually defeated, but the victories were hard-fought.'
0 3
Moreover, other amendments were added to the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act which did provide some limitations on the independence
of the LSP. 0 4
The Nixon Administration also attempted to curb the LSP's
politically sensitive law reform activities. Shortly after the passage
of the 1969 amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act, which
gave the LSP independence from the CAP,' 0 5 OEO Director
Rumsfeld announced a plan to regionalize the LSP.'06 This pro-
posal arose out of a management study within the OEO known as
the McKinsey Report.10 7 Regionalization would have involved a
transfer of authority from the Director of the LSP in Washington
to regional directors of the CAP's throughout the country, result-
ing in greater control by laymen of legal activities and greater
susceptibility of the program to local political pressure.
The organized bar countered the proposal with the Fuchsberg
Report, prepared by a subcommittee of the NAC, which framed the
issue in the following terms:
The fundamental question is whether the advocacy process
is to be maintained and protected as a national instrument.., or
is to be subverted and subordinated to managerial and adminis-
trative prerogatives which are inappropriate for a program of
this kind. 0 8
The bar's strong attack on regionalization prevented its implemen-
thereof." 113 CONG. Rc. 27,871 (1967). The amendment was defeated 52-36 and was not
considered by the House. Id. at 27,873.
102 See 115 CONG. REc. 29,894-97 (1969). This amendment was another attempt to stop
the CRLA from attacking California politicians and public agencies. See Hannon, supra note
55; Karabian, supra note 28.
103 The second Murphy amendment passed the Senate 45-40. 115 CONG. REc. 29,898
(1969). The amendment was defeated in the House after a massive lobbying effort by the
ABA, and was not included in the conference report.
104 The so-called "City Hall" amendments of 1967 provided that henceforth a CAA
must be "a State or a political subdivision of a State ... or a public or private nonprofit
agency or organization which has .been designated by a State or such a political subdivision."
42 U.S.C. § 2790(a) (1970). This provision tightens local governments' control over the CAA.
See J. KERSHAW, supra note 5, at 46.
105 See note 24 supra.
106 Regionalization was first proposed in 1967 by the Director of the CAP.
107 See McKINSEY REPORT, cited in NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. FOR OEO LEGAL SER-
VICES, REGIONALIZATION OF LEGAL SERVICES: AN EXAMINATION OF PROBLEMS AND IssUES 48
(1970).
108 Id. at i.
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tation. In 1970, the regionalization plan was revived, and again the
NAC and the organized bar worked to defeat it.10 9
Even as these two specific proposals to destroy the indepen-
dence of the national LSP were defeated, political interference,
usually in the form of withholding funds, still plagued local
programs."10
The continuing opposition to the LSP's law reform activities
raised serious questions about the wisdom and propriety of a
federal agency pursuing such a policy. Is law reform activity an
economically feasible approach to providing legal services to those
who cannot afford it?"' What makes a good "test case," and what
are the dangers in the "test case" approach? 1 2 What are the
dangers to the program of attacking local and national centers of
political or economic power? Will the goals of the lawyer conflict
with those of his client?" 3 Is it legitimate for a federal agency to act
as a lobbyist for one segment of the population?" 4
By 1971, the debate over legal services was crystallizing. All
sides believed that the LSP needed to be revamped and that the
most viable alternative to the present arrangement was the removal
of the LSP from the OEO and the creation of an independent
109 See 116 CONG. REc. 36,823 (1970). OEO Director Rumsfeld also attempted to
institute a policy of "decentralization." The decentralization plan was Mr. Rumsfeld's last
effort to curb the activities of the LSP, which were considered too radical by the President
and other politicians.
The plan was adopted over the protests of bar leaders and program directors on
November 15, 1970. See OEO Release No. 71-34, CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 8050, at 9092.
However, the plan was rescinded after two months. Id. After this plan was dropped,' the
program returned to the centralized administration adopted in 1969. But Mr. Rumsfeld did
fire LSP Director Lenzner and LSP Assistant Director Jones, ostensibly for being unwilling to
administer the program. See Lenzner, supra note 28, at 10.
110 See Lenzner, supra note 28, at 10.
III An effective law reform program ... is the most economical use of time and
money. True, the time spent is time taken away from providing individual services
but a reform in the law may aid thousands of the poor in the time it takes to solve a
hundred individual problems.... The valuable time of legal service attorneys, then,
is exceedingly well spent on law reform.
Shriver, supra note 90, at 7.
112 See Note, supra note 12, at 813-15. There are many dangers involved in test-case
litigation. The client may settle or the client may lose, either of which could occur after a
great investment of time and money. An even greater problem may be enforcement, i.e.,
securing compliance by the defendant and all such potential defendants with the court's
decision.
113 See notes 24 & 44 and accompanying text supra. An attorney must respect the wishes
of his client and must settle at the client's request. But test-case material is something which
will arise often in the community. The expense and effort of the attorney is not lost since he
will eventually get a client who will continue to fight. See Shriver, supra note 90, at 5-6.
114 See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
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Legal Services Corporation. There the consensus ended, however,
for there was no agreement on either the characteristics or respon-
sibilities of the new Corporation. The old controversy between
reformers and traditionalists merely entered a new phase.
II
THE NATIONAL LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION
A. Introduction-1971-1972
In 1971, the Nixon Administration launched a serious cam-
paign to establish a Legal Services Corporation to replace the
current Legal Services Program.11 5 The concept of an independent
corporation won wide support, but because of the conflicting
objectives of those who favored its establishment, there was little
agreement on how the program should be implemented.
The Administration's proposal"16 was essentially a response to
the barrage of complaints about LSP which the White House had
received from Republican governors and mayors across the
country.1 7 By removing the program from the executive branch,
the President sought simply to divert that criticism elsewhere.
Supporters of legal services, however, preferred the establishment
of a corporation in order to take the program "out of politics" and
allow the professional legal services staff to continue its unpopular
activities without fear of political reprisal."18
This difference in perspective was reflected in some of the
details of the proposals which were first introduced in the early
days of the 92d Congress. The Administration's bill placed restric-
tions on the range of legal services which could be provided by
the Corporation, forbidding lobbying, criminal representation, or
duplicative appeals." 9 Ironically, the Administration proposal gave
the President authority to select the board of directors of the
115 The Ash Council on Executive Reorganization had recommended the establishment
of a legal services corporation divorced from the executive branch.
[T]his program should be placed in an organizational setting which will permit it to
continue serving the legal needs of the poor while avoiding the inevitable political
embarrasment [sic] that the program may occasionally generate.
See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, ESTABLISHMENT OF A
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES-ORGANIZATION FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS
61 (1971).
"1 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoCs. 727 (1971).
117 See Lenzner supra note 28, at 9.
118 See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 66; notes 27 & 28 supra.
"9 See S. 1769, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 905(a)(6),(8), (b)(1) (1971).
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Corporation.120 This provision allowed the executive branch to
retain substantial control over the direction of the program and
simultaneously to renounce responsibility for any unpopular ac-
tivities of legal services attorneys.
The so-called "bipartisan bill"'121 sponsored by Senator Mon-
dale and Representative Steiger differed sharply from the Ad-
ministration proposal. It provided that the majority of members
of the board of directors be chosen by various private
organizations, 12 2 and that some restrictions be placed only on the
Corporation's representation of criminal defendants. 2 3 The bipar-
tisan bill also ensured that LSP would have sufficient funds to
function during the Corporation's formative years.12 4
Late in 1971, Congress passed a Legal Services Corporation
bill,' 25 which denied to the President the right to appoint all of the
members of the Corporation's board of directors12 6 and which
placed control of the program in the hands of private interest
groups during the transition from the OEO to the Corporation. 127
For these reasons the President vetoed the legislation.' 28 Then in
1972, both the House and the Senate passed revised versions of the
1971 Act, but the provisions for a Legal Services Corporation were
dropped by the conference committee because the differences
between the two versions were irreconcilable. 12 9 Moreover, neither
120 Id. § 904.
121 S. 1305, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); H.R. 6361, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
122 S. 1305, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 904(a) (1971). Five members of the board were to be
selected by the President of the United States and one by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. Three members were to be selected by a Clients Advisory Council and three by a
Project Attorney Council. Six ex officio members of the board were to include the president
and president-elect of the ABA, the president of the NLADA, the president of the National
Bar Association (a black lawyer professional association), the president of the ATLA, and the
president of the American Association of Law Schools.
123 S. 2007, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 906(h) (1971).
124 Like the administration bill (S. 1669, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 908 (1971)) the
bipartisan bill did not place a ceiling on the amount which could be appropriated for the
LSP. S. 1305, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 909 (1971). However, the bipartisan bill added a
provision which would have forced the Congress to reserve for the LSP at least $140 million
of the OEO's fiscal 1972 appropriation and at least $170 million of the OEO's fiscal 1973
appropriation. Id. § 4(a).
12 See 117 CONG. REc. 14,042, 31,248 (1971).
126 See S. REP. No. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 904(a)(1)-(5) (1971). Basically, lists of
nominees from various organizations were to be submitted to the President from which he
was required to make his choice. Every list was to contain between three and ten names
for each board position. The board itself would elect one of its number to be the chairman.
127 S. REP. No. 523, supra note 126, at 903.
128 See 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRFs. Docs. 1634-35 (1971); 117 CONG. REc. 46,057 (1971).
The veto withstood an attempt by Congress to override it. See id. at 46,222.
129 See H.R. REP. No. 1367, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1972).
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bill met the President's objections regarding the appointment of
the board and would surely have been met with another veto. In
the meantime, the existing Legal Services Program was kept alive
by emergency funding which provided support for the LSP at the
level of $71.5 million for each fiscal year through June 30, 1974.130
If new authorizing legislation is not approved by that time the
future of the program is in grave danger.
B. The 1973 Proposal-The Impasse Continues
On May 11, 1973, President Nixon once again proposed legis-
lation to establish a Legal Services Corporation.13 1 On June 4,
1973, the House Education and Labor Committee reported out a
bill which was very similar to the Administration version, although
it did contain some significant modifications.' 32 Key changes in-
cluded a more flexible standard of eligibility for legal assistance, 133
elimination of the requirement that certain clients pay a portion of
the legal costs they incur,'3 4 the deletion of language barring
"frivolous" appeals, 35 and the elimination of a new administration
130 42 U.S.C. § 2702b(c)(2) (Supp. II, 1972).
131 See 9 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Docs. 665 (1973).
132 H.R. REP. No. 247, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMITrEE
REPORT].
133 President Nixon suggested that only if a person's income was less than 200% of the
poverty level and did not result from a refusal to seek or accept employment, could he
qualify for assistance from the Corporation.
In § 7(2) of the Committee Report, the eligibility requirements are less specific. The
standards will be determined by taking into account such factors as the client's assets and
debts, size of family, and cost of living. More discretion will be given to individual attorneys
to accept clients. The final House version of the bill retained the committee's standard of
eligibility. H.R. 7824, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a)(2) (1973) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 7824].
134 The ABA was instrumental in convincing the committee to drop the partial payment
plan. See 1973 CoNG. Q. 1448. But see COMMITrEE REPORT 28.
135 President Nixon once again requested a ban on all "frivolous and duplicative"
appeals. The Committee Report provides an unusually clear and decisive guideline on the
matter of appeals:
[The corporation should] establish guidelines for consideration by recipients in
determining whether appeals should be taken to insure efficient utilization of
resources. Although such guidelines would seek to discourage the taking of frivol-
ous appeals, the corporation is not expected to take any steps that would inhibit or
interfere with an attorney's responsibility to take all legal steps necessary to protect
his client. Choices of how best to proceed in particular cases is [sic] always best left to
the attorney and client, and the corporation should not seek to substitute its
judgment for that of the attorney in determining how best to serve the interests of
particular clients . ...
COMMITTEE REPORT 9-10. The language of the Act passed by the House is far more cryptic
and possibly open to abuse, but it does not specifically ban "frivolous and duplicative"
appeals: "[The corporation should] [e]stablish guidelines for consideration of possible
appeals, to be implemented by each recipient to insure the efficient utilization of resources;
except that such guidelines shall in no way interfere with the attorney's responsibilities."
H.R. 7824, § 7(a)(7 ).
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proposal prohibiting grants to public interest law firms. 136 A minor-
ity report was filed, which strongly criticized the bill for the failure
of the subcommittee or the committee to hold hearings before
reporting the legislation 137 and for specific changes in the Ad-
ministration proposal which the minority felt would result in
abuses by politically activist project attorneys. 38 Both of these
criticisms were to be repeated in the House and the Senate during
debate on the Corporation bill. However, the committee bill did
meet the objections raised by President Nixon in his 1971 veto
message. According to the new proposal, the President is to ap-
point all of the members of the board of directors' 39 and the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is to administer legal
services during the transitional stage from the OEO to the
Corporation. 140
On June 21, 1973, the House debated the committee bill at
length. The bill was eventually passed, but was accompanied by
In the House debate on the committee bill, an amendment was added which would
impose on the Corporation the responsibility of paying for court costs and attorney's fees in
an action commenced by the Corporation if a final judgment is rendered for the defendant.
Id. § 6(e). This provision may inhibit the full use of the appeal process.
136 President Nixon suggested a ban on the allocation of funds to public interest law
firms. The committee bill suggests that only those firms spending more than 75% of their
time and resources on such activity should be prohibited from receiving grants from the
Corporation. In the final House version, the figure was reduced to 50%. H.R. 7824 § 7(b)(3).
137 See COM ,MITEE REPORT 26. During debate in the House and the Senate, many
accusations were made concerning the lack of hearings on this particular bill. In fact,
although hearings were not held on the precise proposal, hearings had been held on similar
proposals in 1971 and 1972 and as recently as February-March 1973. See Hearings on H.R.
3147, H.R. 3175, and H.R. 3409 Before the Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
1'38 In spite of the President's request for a total ban on lobbying by legal services
attorneys, the House bill allows such activity when it is part of the necessary representation
of an eligible client pursuant to the guidelines of the Corporation written in accordance with
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics and Code of Professional Responsibility. See CoNNrTEE
REPORT §§ 6(d)(4), 7(a)(5), at 18-19. The House bill stated in § 6(c)(2) that lawyers of the
Corporation could only testify on legislation if requested to do so by the legislators. Later,
however, in § 7(a)(5) the bill provided that lawyers of the Corporation could participate in
lobbying if necessary to the representation of the client. All references to guidelines in
accordance with the Canons of Professional Ethics and Code of Professional Responsibility of the
ABA were deleted as possibly "ambiguous" in this context.
139 See COMMi-rEE REPORT § 4(a). The full House retained this provision. The President
will appoint an I 1-member board of directors with the advice and consent of the Senate. A
majority of the members must be members of the bar of the highest court of the state, none
may be full-time employees of the United States, and only six may belong to the same
political party.
140 See id. § 12. This provision was also retained in the House bill. The control of the
transition period by the Secretary of HEW eliminates earlier Administration objections to
control during this period by private interest groups.
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twenty-four amendments restricting the activities of the Corpora-
tion and of the poverty lawyers. 4 ' Two amendments resulted in a
ban on the funding of back-up centers. 142 Three amendments were
passed that would effectively ban any political activities by full-time
or part-time poverty lawyers.' 43 Not only were the attorneys them-
selves prohibited from engaging in political activities, but also they
were now prohibited from encouraging others to engage in picket-
ing, boycotts, or strikes.' 44 Further restrictions were also placed on
the kinds of cases which legal services attorneys could handle.
Besides the ban on criminal representation, attorneys are no longer
allowed to handle school desegregation cases, 4 5 abortion cases, 46
or draft cases. 147
The committee bill was a compromise between the President's
demands for some executive control and a desire for a strong
141 See 119 CONG. REc. H 5067-138 (daily ed. June 21, 1973).
142 Representative Green offered the amendments, and they were carried by votes of
244-166 and 233-139. See 119 CONG. REC. H 5102, 5127 (daily ed. June 21, 1973).
If the Congress decides that it is necessary to fund somebody to be the cutting
edge for social reform, then I would certainly recommend that it create another
corporation for that purpose. Let us not turn this function over to the Legal Aid
Services attorneys and pretend that the American public is getting a fair deal.
Id. at 5097-98 (remarks of Representative Green). If this provision against funding back-up
centers is enacted into law, much of the work done by the LSP in research and law reform
will have to be curtailed.
143 All of the amendments restricting the political activity of the poverty lawyer were
introduced by Representative Quie. The first amendment provided that any employee
working more than half-time for the corporation, "could not be even in his off time involved
in voter registration drives, or transporting voters to the polls, and he could not take an
active part in political management or political campaigns, whether partisan or non-
partisan." Id. at H 5120 (remarks of Representative Quie) (emphasis added). This amend-
ment passed 207-171. Id.
Representative Quie was also successful in adding a section to the bill declaring that
"neither the corporation nor any recipient shall . . . make available . . . funds or . . .
personnel . . . for use in advocating or opposing any ballot measures, initiatives, referen-
dums, or similar measures." Id. at H 5096. One other amendment prohibited the Corpora-
tion or its lawyers from contributing money, personnel, or equipment to a political candi-
date. Id. Prior to the amendment, federal funds could not be used for these purposes. Now,
any funds received from any source are likewise prohibited from being used in this manner.
144 H.R. 7824, § 6(b)(5).
145 Id. § 7(b)(7). Representative Mizell was particularly incensed over the involvement of
the Harvard Center for Law and Education in the Detroit, Michigan, desegregation case,
Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). See 119 CONG. REc. H 5126 (daily
ed. June 21, 1973) (remarks of Representative Mizell).
146 H.R. 7824 § 7(b)(8). In debate on the abortion amendment, Representative Abzug
suggested that the main effect of the amendment was to make it more difficult for poor
women to get abortions. See 119 CONG. Rc. H 5130 (daily ed. June 21, 1973).
147 Representative Waggonner offered the amendment prohibiting legal assistance for
any matter arising out of a violation of the Selective Service Act or of desertion from the
armed forces. See H.R. 7824 § 7(b) (10).
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independent Legal Services Corporation. Many outright conces-
sions were made by supporters of the latter position. Nonetheless,
many members of Congress who had previously supported the LSP
believed that the amended version of the bill so limited any
independence the Corporation was to have had, that they were not
able to vote for the final House version. 148
The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee did not
report out a legal services bill until November 9, 1973. The Senate
bill made only two major changes in the Administration's
proposal, 149 and both of these were designed to relax restrictions
proposed by the White House. The committee's Report was unani-
mous and was prepared without hearings. On December 10-14,
1973, the Senate held debates on the committee bill. 15° Supporters
of the legislation urged the quick passage of the bill, 15' but many
amendments were submitted on the Senate floor.'
52
On January 31, 1973, the Senate passed the legal services
bill. 53 The legislation which emerged from the Senate differed
significantly from that approved by the House. The Senate bill
authorized a funding limit of $261.5 million for the first three
years of the Corporation's existence, whereas the House bill im-
posed no limit on funding, but provided for automatic termination
of the program in five years.' 54 The Senate resoundingly voted to
148 1 was prepared to swallow the compromise agreement that had been worked out
on the legal services bill ...
However, there must come a time in every Member's existence where he
reaches the breaking point, and I am leaving this bill as of right now. I refuse in the
name of common decency .. . to continue my support of this bill.
119 CONG. REC. H 5136 (daily ed. June 21, 1973) (remarks of Representative Conyers).
149 See S. REP. No. 495, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). One change approved by the
committee was a more flexible definition of eligibility requirements for clients. The
committee's Report used a test of inability to afford legal services as a criterion for eligibility
and for denying aid to persons who refused suitable work. A second change made in
committee was the addition of a 15-member national advisory council to be appointed by the
board of directors to assist the Corporation to establish policy.
The remainder of the Report was in harmony with the President's proposal.
150 See 119 CONG. REc. S 22,394-408 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1973); id. S 22,556-64 (daily ed.
Dec. 11, 1973); id. S 22,701-20 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1973); id. S 22,840-46 (daily ed. Dec. 13,
1973); id. S 22,963-70 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1973).
151 See, e.g., Letter from Presidential Advisor Melvin Laird to Gaylord Nelson, October
4, 1973), quoted in 119 CONG. REc. S 22,403 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1973).
152 The introduction of numerous amendments embodied a strategy of opponents of
the bill aimed at blocking any passage during the session. After two previous unsuccessful
attempts, a motion to invoke cloture was finally passed, and the filibuster was ended. See 120
CONG. REc. S 823 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974).
1'3 See 120 CONG. REc. S 1012 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974). The vote for final passage was
69-17.
154 See S. 2686, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1010(a) (1974); H.R. 7824, §§ 3(d), 10(a).
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preserve the back-up centers, which were eliminated by the House
bill, 155 and to reestablish the National Advisory Council.' 56 The
Senate approved in principle the right of legal services attorneys to
accept outside compensation for work done on their own time,
which was prohibited in the House bill.' 5 7 Finally, the Senate
rejected any ban on the use of legal services funds in busing
suits.' 58 Only abortion suits or suits on behalf of violators of the
Selective Service laws or deserters from the armed forces are
prohibited. 59 These differences portend a very difficult confer-
ence, but should the bill survive the conference, it is likely that the
President will sign it into law.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers must be able to act independently for the best in-
terests of their clients. Political pressures should not be allowed to
impinge on the process of providing legal services to those who are
unable to afford private attorneys. The proposed legislation will be
one step in the right direction, providing a permanent, indepen-
dent, and relatively well-funded home for one of the most success-
ful of the poverty programs. But it is not yet time for complacency.
More innovation in methods of providing legal services needs to be
undertaken. Moreover, through whatever means possible, more of
the people who need legal assistance must be reached so that
tensions and inequities in our society can begin to be resolved
through peaceful, rather than violent means.
Shira A. Scheindlin
155 See 120 CONG. REc. S 971-72 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974); note 142 supra.
156 S. 2686, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1004(i) (1974).
157 See 32 CONG. Q. 254 (1974); note 143 supra.
158 See 120 CONG. REc. S 964 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974).
159 See id. S 965. See also S. 2686, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1007(b)(7), (8) (1974).
